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An often heard view is that exchange rate variability will decrease for
a country that joins the EMU. This is not necessarily true. Both real
and nominal exchange rate variability increase under certain
circumstances when asymmetric demand shocks occur inside or
outside the union. These results are obtained theoretically within a
standard international macro-model but they also remain valid in a
numerical simulation of this model.
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There are at the moment three countries that have not yet decided whether they will
participate fully in the European Economic and Monetary Union (the EMU): The United
Kingdom, Sweden and Denmark. Some of the most central arguments regarding this
important and probably irreversible decision are1: A membership would reduce exchange rate
variability and thus be advantageous to firms and others that are engaged in foreign economic
activity2. Furthermore, a membership would give microeconomic benefits in the form of
lower costs of international transactions. The perhaps most important disadvantage, on the
other hand, is the loss of independent monetary policy as a means to reduce the real impact of
asymmetric shocks. This paper questions the EMU-positive argument above about reduced
exchange rate variability. The nominal exchange rate variability between a possible entrant
and the rest of the EMU will of course disappear as a result of a membership but the
interesting thing is that it is not necessary that a membership in the EMU reduces total real (or
nominal) exchange rate variability when variability to other currencies are included in the
analysis.
The purpose of this paper is therefore to show how this possibly surprising result may
arise, which is done by examining how total exchange rate variability due to macroeconomic
shocks may change if a country joins the EMU. The paper will only deal with such exchange
rate variability that has its origin in macroeconomic demand shocks and does not attempt to
explain or discuss exchange rate fluctuations on a day to day basis.
The problem is analysed within an intertemporal framework with sticky prices for one
period3. The shocks that create the need for exchange rate adjustments are permanent and
asymmetric demand shocks which only affect one currency area directly. When a shock hits
one country the exchange rates adjust immediately to restore equilibrium in the goods markets
of the different countries. If a country joins the EMU, the value of the entrant's currency can
no longer adjust and, because of that, output in the entering country will have to move away
from its long run equilibrium level temporarily to clear the goods market. After one period
prices become fully flexible and output returns to its long-run level. The exchange rates to
countries outside the EMU are crucial to this analysis so the model has to consist of at least
three countries: The EMU-entrant, the rest of the EMU and the rest of the world. In general,
all exchange rates change due to a shock and the total effect is captured by an index that
incorporates all the exchange rates that the entrant faces. Whether the possible entrant is a
member of the union or not will affect the value of this index which means that one can
                                                
1SOU 1996:158.
2For a presentation of some of the arguments in the literature regarding aversion to exchange rate variability, see
Section  3.1.
3The realistic degree of nominal price rigidity is a controversial issue but what is needed to get the qualitative
results in this model is only that goods prices and wages are more sticky than nominal exchange rates. Menu
costs, for instance, may be a reason for the kind of price rigidity assumed. See Akerlof and Yellen (1985),
Mankiw (1985) or Blanchard and Kiyotaki (1987).calculate the value of the index under both regimes and compare the results to see which of
the regimes that leads to most variability. Two exchange rate variability indices are used in
this paper. Both incorporate all the exchange rates that the entrant faces but they take slightly
different aspects into account.
The most central result is that total exchange rate variability may increase if a country
joins the EMU. One gets less exchange rate variability with a flexible currency as well as less
output variability when shocks occur outside the entering country. The reason is that a change
in the value of the euro will change the entering country's competitiveness directly and thus
affect the equilibrium of the goods market in that country. As long as nominal prices are not
completely flexible, the entrant will have to accept that asymmetric demand shocks have real
effects on the home economy. These effects could have been avoided, had the country stayed
outside the monetary union.
The most important reference when constructing the model is without doubt Obstfeld's
and Rogoff's (1995) influential paper on exchange rate dynamics. One of the most important
differences compared to Obstfeld's and Rogoff's model is that their model in addition to
consumption incorporate money in the utility function but also disutility of labour to allow for
a somewhat richer supply side of the economy. Their model produces some rather nasty-
looking expressions already in the case of two countries, though. By letting a traditional LM-
equation handle the existence of money the model becomes much simpler which is necessary
in order to describe as many as four countries simultaneously. This makes the model similar
to a traditional static Mundell-Fleming model in the way described by Genberg (1989) but the
model in this paper differs as it has a two-period reduced form coming from an underlying
intertemporal macro model.
In section 2 the model is presented. It is followed by section 3 in which the
consequences of macroeconomic demand shocks are examined analytically. Possible
extensions are presented in section 4. In Section 5 numerical values are assigned to the
analytical results in sections 3 and 4 through a simple simulation. Conclusions, finally, are
presented in section 6.2. The Model
For convenience, Sweden represents the entering country but the model is general enough to
make it possible to study the effects of any country which considers entering a monetary
union where the entrant is small relative to the rest of the union which in turn is small relative
to the rest of the world. This means that the model will have a recursive structure as shocks
only have a one way impact from large to small countries4. The common formal structure of
the countries of the model makes it possible to derive the model in two steps: First one
country is described in section 2.1 and then two more countries are incorporated in section
2.2.
2.1 An Open Economy
The goods market is the central market in the analysis but to be able to derive the reduced
form for the goods market equilibrium condition some conditions from the international
capital markets and from the money markets are needed.
First, the uncovered interest parity condition,
i 
j -  i 
k  = 
E  e 
j / k  -  E 
j / k 
E j / k  , (1)
is assumed to hold to ensure equilibrium in the international capital markets. The term
(  E  e 
j / k -  E 
j / k ) / E 
j / k  is the expected relative change in the exchange rate5. All shocks in the
model are permanent and unexpected which means that all changes in nominal exchange rates
are unexpected. This means that the right hand side of (1) is zero at all times and that all
nominal interest rates become equal to the world market interest rate i .
The exchange rate expectations above are rational as long as shocks are permanent. If
no shocks occur then the world economy will stay in the initial equilibrium and there will be
no adjustments. If a shock occurs, then the exchange rates will change once and for all to a
new long run equilibrium level.
Second, suppose that a standard LM-equation is an appropriate description of the
money market in each country. The expression
L 
j ( Y 
j , i ) = 
M 
j 
P j  , j =  ( S  , EMU )  (2a)
says that demand for real money is a positive function of aggregate output and a negative
function of the nominal interest rate. When Sweden enters the monetary union, the expression
                                                
4In the numerical simulation this assumption is relaxed so that Sweden can affect the EMU economy.
5The exchange rate E 
j / k 
 is is the exchange rate between countries j and k, expressed as the amount of currency j
needed to buy one unit of currency k.changes slightly as Sweden and the rest of the EMU establish a union (U) with a common
money market:
L 
U ( Y 
S +  Y 
EMU , i ) = 
M 
U 
P  U  . (2b)
The central banks are assumed to prefer more price and output stability to less. If all exchange
rates are flexible, then there is no conflict between the targets of zero-inflation and output
stability and the central banks will therefore keep the money supply constant and thus achieve
both targets. It can be seen from (2a) that a constant money supply and a constant nominal
interest rate will imply constant output as there is no need for prices to change since the once
and for all adjustment in nominal exchange rates due to a shock will bring about the shift in
international relative prices necessary to restore equilibrium immediately with no need for
output or prices to adjust. Thus (2a) fixes output at its long run level and this equation can
therefore be dropped. Equation (2b) must be kept, however, as it will determine short run
output (which may be different from the long run equilibrium level) when Sweden is a part of
the monetary union. It is optimal for the European Central Bank (ECB) to keep the supply of
the euro constant as this policy stabilises the price and total output level of the union. Since
Sweden is small6 compared to the rest of the European Union, the approximation that the
weight addressed to Swedish output in equation (2b) approaches zero is used. This means that
(2b) puts no restriction on Swedish output at all.
A very important presumption is that goods prices and wages are constant during one
period and then completely flexible. The crucial point is that goods prices and wages must be
more sticky than nominal exchange rates which seems very reasonable.
In order to derive the goods market equilibrium condition, start with the intertemporal
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where C  Wt
S  , for instance, denotes the Swedish individuals' period t consumption of the good
produced in the rest of the world. The price of this good, P  t 
W , must be multiplied by the
nominal exchange rate,E  t 
S / W , to be measured in kronor. The parameters ß , g  and d  belong to
the interval (0,1) in line with standard assumptions. Real income before taxes, Y  1 
S , can vary in
period one but the economy will immediately reach its steady state income level in period two
                                                
6Swedish GDP is approximately 3% of total output in the European Union.when prices become fully flexible. Disposable income is equal to Y  t 
S  minus the lump-sum tax
T  t 
S . Preferences are assumed to be properly described by a standard CES utility function. In
line with empirical results7 and as a convenient simplification, assume that the elasticity of
imports with respect to the real exchange rate is equal to one. One way of entering this
assumption into the model is by altering the utility function to the one in the maximisation
problem (3) above. This particular utility function has Cobb-Douglas-utility between
domestic goods and imports and CES-utility between imports from different countries.
Through this specification expenditures on imports become a constant share of total
expenditures which means that the elasticity of imports with respect to the real exchange rate
is equal to one8. With one additional simplifying assumption about how the asymmetric
shocks work the following reduced form is derived in Appendix A:
dY
S = f  EMU 
S  dE
S  / EMU  + f  W 
S dE
S  / W + du
S , (4)
where all f j 
i  are positive. The right hand side of (4) states that a depreciation of the Swedish
krona increases demand for the Swedish good. How large effect a depreciation of the krona
against the euro, for instance, has on Swedish aggregate demand depends on the size of f  EMU 
S 
which simply is a measure of how sensitive Swedish exports to the EMU-area are to changes
in the exchange rate between the krona and the euro. Aggregate demand is also affected by
the asymmetric demand shock, du
S 
, which, by definition, only has a direct effect on demand
for the Swedish good. Equation (4) is the central relationship in the analysis below.
2.2 A Model with Three Countries
Using equation (4) and its counterpart in the EMU-area the following two equations will
always hold regardless of the exchange rate regime:
dY
S = f  EMU 
S  dE
S  / EMU  + f  W 
S dE
S  / W + du
S 
0 = f  S 
EMU dE
EMU / S + f  W 
EMU dE




To be able to solve the model, expressions linking the different exchange rates are needed.
The no arbitrage condition,
E 
j / k = E 
i / k 
E 
i / j ,
                                                
7Goldstein & Kahn (1985).
8If the import elasticity is equal to one then an exchange rate depreciation by ten percent decreases the imported
volume by ten percent which means that expenditures on imports stay the same since the volume imported
decreases by ten percent at the same time as the price increases by ten percent. Import expenditures are thus a
constant share of total expenditures.can be used to rewrite the three different exchange rates above in terms of two exchange rates.
Differentiate the no arbitrage condition and set the exchange rates equal to one in the initial
equilibrium:
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It will turn out to be convenient to write all exchange rates in terms of dE
S / EMU 
 and dE
EMU  / W 
which gives:
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EMU dE
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(6b)
This system consists of two equations and three unknown variables. When Sweden is outside
the EMU the following additional condition applies:
dY
S = 0 , (7)
since output in Sweden is determined by (2a). If, on the other hand, Sweden joins the union
then the condition
dE
S / EMU  = 0 , (8)
must be added instead.
The next step to be carried out is to solve the model (6)-(8) while the effects of
demand shocks on exchange rate variability will be examined in detail in section 3.2.3 The Recursive Structure
It follows from the assumption that Sweden is a small country that a change in the exchange
rate between Sweden and the EMU affects aggregate demand in the EMU to a very small
extent. Thus the approximation
f  S 
EMU  =  0 
is used which makes the model recursive:
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The reason why the structure is recursive is simply that, whatever happens in Sweden, it is of
no importance to the two other larger countries in the world.
The EMU
The effects on the EMU are:
dE
EMU  / W 
duS  =  0 ; (10a)
dE
EMU  / W 
du
EMU  = - 
1 
f  W 
EMU  <  0 . (10b)
A shock in the small country Sweden does not affect the EMU so its exchange rate against the
rest of the world does not need to adjust. When a positive demand shock hits the EMU the
agents of that country demand more goods at the prevailing price level. Actual output in the
EMU is fixed through the money market equilibrium condition (2a). Prices are fixed for one
period so nominal exchange rates must adjust to clear the goods market. The relative price of
the good produced in the EMU increases through the appreciation of the euro (E 
EMU  / W 
decreases) which goes on until exports have decreased enough to balance the original increase
in demand.Sweden with a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
Substitute the condition that aggregate income is fixed (7) into (9a) to obtain
(  f  EMU 
S  +  f  W 
S )  dE
S / EMU  + f  W 
S dE
EMU  / W  = -  du
S . (11)
If the shock hits Sweden then the change in the exchange rate E 
EMU  / W 
 is equal to zero
according to (10a) since a change in Swedish demand does not affect demand in the large
countries. A new goods market equilibrium is reached through the appreciation of the krona
which leads to reduced demand for the Swedish good through a decrease in exports.
The solution when the shock hits the EMU is
dE
S / EMU 
du
EMU  = 
f  W 
S 
f  W 
EMU ( f  EMU 
S  +  f  W 
S ) 
> 0 .
In this case the euro appreciates against currency W as discussed above. As no shock has
appeared in Sweden, a strengthening of the krona against one currency has to be offset by a
weakening against another currency to prevent the goods market from being out of
equilibrium. To preclude arbitrage profits in the foreign exchange market, the krona has to
appreciate against currency W and depreciate against the euro, which can be seen from the no
arbitrage condition
dE
S / W  =  dE
S / EMU  +  dE
EMU  / W 
.
Sweden Inside the Monetary Union
Substitute condition (8) into (9a) and use (10a) and (10b) to solve for
dY
S 





EMU  = - 
f  W 
S 
f  W 
EMU  .
A shock in Sweden can no longer be met by exchange rate adjustments. Output therefore has
to rise above the long run equilibrium level to clear the goods market. When a shock hits the
EMU the euro appreciates which decreases Swedish exports to the rest of the world. The only
way the Swedish goods market can remain in equilibrium is through a corresponding decline
in output.3 Theoretical Analysis
3.1 Variability of the Average Exchange Rate
It was mentioned in the introduction that firms are said to care about exchange rate variability.
The question that naturally arises is: Why should they care about such variability? It seems
reasonable to assume that what firms primarily care about is variation in relative prices or
competitiveness. A change in the nominal exchange rate is no problem if wages and prices are
fully flexible but when wages or prices are sticky the risk of prolonged mispricing emerges.
Firms can of course protect themselves against fluctuations by using forward contracts but
they increase costs. Hedging against a short-term international transaction is simple and
straightforward, but hedging against long-term variability is likely to be very complicated,
given never-ceasing changes in expectations about long-term conditions9. Small firms may
lack necessary knowledge to know how and to what extent they should protect themselves
against exchange rate variability.
The debate in newspapers and other media regarding the EMU reveals that many
company managers speak strongly in favour of a Swedish membership in the EMU using the
argument that exchange rate uncertainty reduces the level of aggregate investment. This alone
is a reason to analyse the issues in this paper since the argument rests on the presumption that
a Swedish membership in the EMU will reduce exchange rate variability. This is not
necessarily the case, however, as will be seen later. One can go one step further, however, by
asking if it is reasonable to assume that price variability really reduces investment. This is not
a main question in this paper but it is still important for the relevance of the results. Three
different approaches towards investments under uncertainty will be briefly discussed here:
The theory of irreversible investments, the Arrow-Lind approach and an application of agency
theory.
It is very easy to show that a single firm chooses to postpone irreversible investments
if price variability increases10. Suppose that the price randomly takes on either a higher or a
lower value next period. The investment project has a positive expected net present value but
the company will not invest if it knows that the price goes down next period. This means that
the value of the option to wait to invest until the price change is observed increases if the
variance of the price movement increases as the upside potential payoff from the option
increases while the downside payoff is left unchanged at zero since the option to invest will
not be exercised if the price falls. Such a postponement can possibly extend over several years
and lead to lower investment levels than those that would have been realised without
uncertainty. However, the irreversible investment literature gives much less support to a
reduction in long run investment levels in a general equilibrium context: "For aggregate or
                                                
9Friberg, R. & Vredin, A. (1997), p. 581.
10Dixit & Pindyck (1994) p. 39.industry-wide uncertainty, the value of waiting for any one firm does drop to zero..."11. The
results that remain are that irreversibility implies slower investment adjustments to price
changes but not necessarily lower investment levels in the long run12. Moreover, Ricardo J.
Caballero states that the often heard argument that "more uncertainty implies less capital" is a
misconception about the implications of the theory of irreversible investment13.
A very much used result when constructing models with a representative agent is the
Arrow-Lind theorem. The theorem states that the manager of a firm owned by many small
risk averse individuals should act as if the firm was owned by one risk-neutral agent. A
crucial assumption is that the payoffs from the company's possible investment project and the
owners' other incomes are uncorrelated. It seems reasonable, though, to suppose that project
payoffs often are positively correlated with other incomes as both kinds of payoffs are likely
to be correlated to the overall economic performance of the economy. In that case it is
reasonable that managers will act as being risk averse in order to maximise the utility of the
owners and that firms will require a risk premium despite the fact that projects are spread over
many shareholders.14
Risk-averse managers is another issue. Managers have a large part of their personal
capital tied up in their firms and they will therefore be concerned about total risk while
shareholders only care about nondiversifiable risk with respect to a firm's different projects.
Thus risk-averse managers are likely to choose safer projects with lower expected returns
which is in conflict with the shareholders interests since they prefer riskier ventures as
shareholders do not share a rise in profits with bondholders while the bondholders bear part of
the risk of failure15.
Thus there may exist reasons for firms to act in a risk averse way when being exposed
to uncertainty regarding the price of their products.
3.2 First Period Exchange Rate Variability
A simple and natural measure of aggregate variability in international relative prices, in the
context of the model derived above and during the first period when goods prices are
constant, is the Average Exchange Rate Index (dAEI ):
                                                
11Ibid. p. 248. This is a result of a general equilibrium where all firms have the potential to make the same
innovations at the same time which implies that a single firm fears that other firms may have made the same
innovation and that they also are planning to make the same investment. This makes waiting a meaningless
alternative.
12Ibid. p. 261-267.
13"More uncertainty raises reluctance [to invest] precisely because it raises the need to reduce the extent of
excessive capital during the now deeper recessions. Without raising reluctance, an increase in uncertainty would
raise the average stock of capital in the presence of irreversibility constraints. This occurs because there would
now be greater capital accumulation during extremely good times which would not be offset by large
disinvestment during extremely bad times." (Caballero, R. J. (1997), p. 21.)
14Arrow, K. J. & Lind, R. (1970).
15Easterbrook, F. H. (1984), p. 653.dAEI = 
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The weights f i 
S  simply measure the sensitivity of aggregate demand to changes in exchange
rates, dEX 
S / dE
S / i , and thus reflect how important foreign trade with a particular country is.
Note that, since goods prices are constant in the first period, nominal and real exchange rate
variability are equal. This index is appropriate to use if companies in Sweden, without
additional costs, can redirect their exports from one country to another16. The effects when
the krona appreciates against one currency and depreciates against another may therefore
cancel and leave the value of the index unaffected. Exchange rate variability is in that case no
burden to firms. The next step is to evaluate how the Average Exchange Rate Index is
affected by different shocks.
Demand Shock in Sweden
Since Sweden is small the positive demand shock there has no effect on the EMU where
E 
EMU  / W 
 is determined. As can be seen from (11) the appreciation of the krona completely
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where F denotes the case of a flexible exchange rate between the krona and the euro. In the





=  0 ,
where U denotes the case of monetary union. The effect of the demand shock will instead be
an increase in production. By joining the union one can eliminate exchange rate variability in
the first period when shocks hit Sweden but at the cost of more output variation.
Demand Shock in the EMU
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16If this is not the case, the Absolute Value Index used in section 4.5-4.7 may be a better measure of exchange
rate variability.through equation (11) as exchange rate adjustments will keep the Swedish goods market in
equilibrium without any need for deviations in output. Equation (9b) will give the new
equilibrium exchange rate E 
EMU  / W 
 while E 
S / EMU 
 will respond just enough to keep Sweden in
equilibrium.
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This is a negative expression which means that the Swedish currency (the euro in this case)
appreciates when the rest of the EMU is hit by a positive shock. The fact that (12b) is
different from zero while (12a) is equal to zero means that Sweden faces larger total exchange
rate variability when Sweden is inside the union than outside and the shock hits the rest of the
EMU-area. The appreciation of the euro can only be met by a corresponding reduction in
Swedish production. Thus exchange rate variability, as well as output variability, increases if
Sweden joins the monetary union and shocks hit the rest of the EMU-area. From expression
(12b) one can see that the larger Swedish trade with the rest of the world is, the more
exchange rate variability increases. The reason for this is that the common currency, the euro,
appreciates against currency W due to the shock in the EMU. This appreciation of the
Swedish currency is more burdensome to Sweden if the rest of the world is an important
Swedish trade partner. With flexible rates the value of the krona will adjust to neutralise the
effect on Sweden of the appreciation of the euro. This last mechanism will disappear if
Sweden joins the EMU. Instead production must decrease to meet the weaker Swedish
aggregate demand.
Results in Brief
When measuring exchange rate variability with the Average Exchange Rate Index and when
shocks hit Sweden one gets the result that Sweden faces less variability being inside the
EMU. This reduced exchange rate variability will however come at the cost of more variation
in output. When shocks hit the EMU, though, Sweden will face more exchange rate and
output variability inside the EMU. The results so far are illustrated in Tables 1 and 2 on pages
15 and 16 (the first and last row of each table).
3.3 Second Period Price Variability
It is assumed that the kind of exchange rate variability that firms care about is changes in
international competitiveness. Then all changes in relative prices because of a shock must be
incorporated, not only first period changes in nominal exchange rates. In some cases, goodsprices have to adjust in the second period so that the Swedish economy can return to long run
equilibrium.
Demand Shock in Sweden
If Sweden has a flexible exchange rate regime and a shock hits Sweden, then the nominal
exchange rate immediately appreciates just enough to keep the Swedish goods market in long
run equilibrium and thus there will be no need for any further relative price adjustments in the
second period. Being inside the monetary union a relative price change, equal to the one in the
case with a flexible regime, will take place but one period later through an increase in the
price of the Swedish good17. This is illustrated in Figure 1, where P 
S  / P 
*  denotes the relative
price of the Swedish good compared to an index of prices of international goods.
                                                
17It follows from (A16) in Appendix A that Y » P  Y  if the export elasticity is approximately equal to 1. It can be
shown easily that Y  d  P = dY
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= 1   or, in other words, the export elasticity equals one.
Using d  P =  - dE
S  / EMU   to determine d  P   allows for export elasticities different from one.Figure 1: Relative Price Changes and Output Changes due to a Swedish Demand Shock
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Demand Shock in the EMU
When the krona is a flexible currency, adjustments in the value of the krona will always keep
the Swedish goods market in long run equilibrium. Thus there is no need for price
adjustments in the second period after the shock. The value of the krona will change in such a
way that total terms of trade, or P 
S  / P 
* , stay constant which keeps the Swedish economy in
long run equilibrium which can be seen in Figure 2a.
In the case where Sweden is a member of the EMU, the Swedish currency (the euro)
appreciates which brings the Swedish goods market out of long run equilibrium until a
decrease in the price of the Swedish good can restore the initial equilibrium. The relative
price changes in period one and two are of course equally large which is illustrated in Figure
2b.Figure 2: Relative Price Changes and Output Changes due to a Demand Shock in the
EMU
a) Flexible Regime
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3.4 Total Real Exchange Rate Variability
The total real effect on competitiveness must incorporate the whole time-horizon. As Figure 1
reveals, a shock in Sweden must lead to an international relative price change to restore long
run equilibrium. There are two possible mechanisms through which these relative changes can
take place; either through the nominal exchange rate immediately after the shock, or through
the nominal price of the Swedish good one period later. Apart from the fact that the change in
the price of the Swedish good comes with a one period lag, these changes in relative prices
are completely identical. What really differs, though, is that one can avoid output variability
by staying outside the EMU. Table 1 sums these results.Table 1: Effects of a Shock in Sweden
C h  a n g e    i  n    n o m i  n a l     e x c h a n g  e    r a t e s    (  p e r  i o  d    1 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    g o o  d s    p r i  c  e s     ( p e r i  o d    2 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    r e a l     e x c h  a n g e    r a t e  s    (  p e  r i o  d    1    a n d    2 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    o u t p u t 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 










Sweden can get rid of all variation in relative prices as well as in output, when shocks hit the
EMU, by staying outside the monetary union which can be seen in Figure 2a. The nature of
the change in the real exchange rate, that takes place if Sweden is a member of the EMU, is
different with this shock, though, as such a shock only gives temporary effects on the real
exchange rate while a shock in Sweden results in a permanent change in the international
relative price of the Swedish good. A shock in the EMU-area thus has no effect on Swedish
competitiveness beyond the second period so the effect on total competitiveness would
approach zero if the length of the period with sticky prices would approach zero. Provided
that prices and wages are more sticky than nominal exchange rates, there will remain some
change in competitiveness that will result in a temporary change in output from its long run
equilibrium level.
Table 2: Effects of a Shock in the EMU
C h  a n g e    i  n    n o m i  n a l     e x c h a n g  e    r a t e s    (  p e r  i o  d    1 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    g o o  d s    p r i  c  e s     ( p e r i  o d    2 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    r e a l     e x c h  a n g e    r a t e  s    (  p e  r i o  d    1    a n d    2 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    o u t p u t 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 









The assumption of sticky prices is the single most important factor to explain the results in
Tables 1 and 2. If prices would be fully flexible then the real exchange rate could always
adjust through nominal prices or wages and the existence of a flexible nominal exchange rate
would be an unimportant issue. Faced with sticky prices the extreme flexibility of nominal
exchange rates can play a very important role in keeping the economy close to long run
equilibrium. What kind of exchange rate variability that counts is also important and, to allowfor an other approach towards exchange rate variability, an alternative index will be used in
the next section.
4. Extensions
A natural extension is to allow for a fourth country. If this fourth country is a more important
trade partner for Sweden than for the rest of the EMU, then it is reasonable to think that such
asymmetries can affect how exchange rate variability changes if Sweden enters the monetary
union. Another possible extension is to use an exchange rate variability index that builds on
the assumption that all exchange rate variability matters, even if total competitiveness does
not change. These two extensions will be dealt with in the next two sub-sections.
4.1 A Four-Country Model
A fourth country is added by dividing the rest of the world into two countries. Such a partition
of the rest of the world may be important if the EMU and Sweden have asymmetric trade
relations to the fourth country. Three possible candidate countries in the real world are the
US, the UK and Norway. All these countries can be considered as important Swedish trade
partners but whether they are more important to Sweden than to the EMU and to what extent
such asymmetries really matter will be examined in the quantitative simulation in Section 5.
The analysis that follows can be applied to all these countries but for convenience this new
country will be labelled "the US". The two equations that describe the US are the following
counterparts to (6a) and (2a):
dY
US = f  S 
USdE
US/ S + f  EMU 
US dE
US/ EMU  +  f  W 
USdE
US/ W  +  du
US
L 
US(  Y 




The US is assumed not to enter the monetary union which implies that output will always be
constant in the US as a result of the money market equilibrium condition. The countries
Sweden, the EMU and the US are still small compared to W while Sweden is also small
compared to the EMU and the US. The following counterpart to the equation system (5a),
(5b) will hold regardless of the exchange rate regime:
dY
S = f EMU 
S  dE
S / EMU  + f US
S  dE
S / US +  f W 
S dE
S / W  +  du
S 
0 = f S 
EMU dE
EMU  / S +  f US
EMU dE
EMU  / US +  f W 
EMU  dE
EMU  / W  +  du
EMU 
0 = f S 
USdE
US /  S + f EMU 
US dE
US / EMU  +  f W 
USdE





To solve the model, arbitrage conditions of the kind used in the three-country model must be
used. They make it possible to express all exchange rates in terms of E 
S / EMU 
, E 
EMU  / US
 andE 
EMU  / W . The resulting equation system will consist of three equations and four unknown
variables so one also has to add condition (7) or (8) exactly as in the three-country model to
make the model complete. Now make full use of the assumption that Sweden is small
compared to the EMU and the US by setting both f  S 
EMU  and f  S 
US to zero. This gives
-  1  ( f  EMU 
S  +  f  US
S  + f  W 
S )  f  US
S  f  W 
S 
0  0  f  US
EMU  f  W 
EMU 
0  0  -  (  f  EMU 
US +  f  W 















































Exchange Rate Solutions for the EMU and the US
Make use of the recursivity in system (14a)-(14c). Then solve the simplified simultaneous
remainder of the model that holds regardless of the exchange rate regime:
f  US
EMU  f  W 
EMU 
-  ( f  EMU 
US +  f  W 
US)  f  W 
US
Ø 
º  Œ 
ø 




EMU / W 
Ø 
º  Œ 
ø 






º  Œ 
ø 
ß  œ  ; A  = f  US
EMU f  W 
US + f  W 
EMU (  f  EMU 
US +  f  W 
US ) > 0 ,
where  A  is the determinant of the equation system. The solutions are:
dE
EMU  / US = 
f  W 
EMU du






EMU  / W  = - 
f  US
EMU du
US +  ( f  EMU 





When a positive demand shock hits the EMU, the euro appreciates for the same reason as in
the three-country model. The same mechanism also gives rise to an appreciation of the dollar
(dE
EMU  / US > 0  and dE
US / W  =  dE
EMU  / W -  dE
EMU / US <  0 ) when a demand shock occurs in the
US.
Sweden with a Flexible Exchange Rate Regime
A positive Swedish shock leads to an appreciation of the krona to compensate for the increase
in demand just as in the three-country model. The other currencies will of course be
unaffected as Sweden is a small country. This means that (14a) gives
dE
S / EMU 
du
S  = 
dE
S  / US
du
S  = 
dE
S  / W 
du
S  = - 
1 
(  f  EMU 
S  + f  US
S  +  f  W 
S ) 
< 0 ,as the no arbitrage conditions state that
dE
S / US = dE




S / W  =  dE
S / EMU  +  dE
EMU  / W 
.
Now turn to shocks in the EMU and the US. Using the already obtained solutions for
dE
EMU  / US
 (15) and dE
EMU  / W 
 (16) and substituting them into equation (14a) one finds that:
dE
S / EMU 
du
EMU  = 
f  US
S  f  W 
US +  f  W 
S ( f  EMU 
US +  f  W 
US) 
A ( f  EMU 
S  +  f  US
S  + f  W 
S ) 
>  0 ; (17)
dE




EMU f  W 
S  -  f  W 
EMU f  US
S 
A (  f  EMU 
S  +  f  US
S  + f  W 
S ) 
> 
<  0 . (18)
When a positive shock hits the EMU the euro must appreciate to clear the goods market in the
EMU-area. From equation (14a)18 one can see that the krona will depreciate against the euro
just enough to compensate for the decrease in the two exchange rates E 
EMU  / US and E 
EMU  / W  so
that Swedish total terms of trade are unchanged and the goods market of Sweden can remain
in equilibrium.
A positive shock in the US leads to an appreciation of the dollar. How the exchange
rate between the krona and the euro will be affected depends on the relations between Sweden
and the rest of the EMU-countries. What determines the sign of (18) is whether
f  US
EMU 






f  W 
S  . (19)
The right-hand side of the expression is a measure of Swedish conditions and reflects the
relation between the sensitivities of Swedish exports to changes in the dollar and currency W
respectively. This can be interpreted as a measure of the relative economic distance from
Sweden to the US and the rest of the world. Geographical and economic distance are related
as a change in a currency of a nation close to Sweden in general is of greater importance than
changes in an exchange rate to a more distant country. The sign of the expression above
depends on the relative economic distances to the US and W from Sweden and the EMU-area
respectively.
                                                
18Remember that Swedish output is constant when all exchange rates are flexible.Just to enable an intuitive interpretation of expression (19), make the temporary
assumption that
f  W 
S  = f  W 
EMU  ,
and examine this special case where Sweden and the EMU-area are equally sensitive to
changes in their respective exchange rate versus the rest of the world. Suppose, in addition,
that a change in the value of the dollar affects demand for the Swedish good more than
demand for the EMU-good f  US
S  >  f  US
EMU . Then the appreciation of the dollar (because of the
shock in the US) against the krona and the euro leads to a larger increase in Swedish exports
to the US than in EMU-exports to the US. This asymmetric stimuli of Sweden compared to
the EMU has to be compensated for by an appreciation of the krona against the euro to
stimulate the economy of the EMU relative to Sweden so that Sweden and the EMU both can
remain in equilibrium.
Sweden Inside the Monetary Union
Whether Sweden joins the EMU or not will of course have no effect on the other countries
but, exactly as in the three-country model, changes in the value of the krona can no longer
restore equilibrium. Instead the output level must be above or below its long run level until a
change in the price of the Swedish good can bring the Swedish economy back to long run
equilibrium.
4.2 First Period Exchange Rate Variability
The Average Exchange Rate Index now includes variation to the US and will because of that
appear as follows:
dAEI = 
f  EMU 
S  dE
S / EMU  +  f  US
S  dE
S / US +  f  W 
S dE
S / W 
f  EMU 
S  +  f  US
S  +  f  W 
S  .
Demand Shock in Sweden
The qualitative results and interpretations are identical to those given in section 3.2.
Demand Shock in the EMU












S  f  W 
US +  f  W 
S ( f  EMU 
US +  f  W 
US) 
A (  f  EMU 
S  +  f  US
S  +  f W 
S ) 
< 0  (20)
through the same mechanisms as in section 3.2. Expression (20) is negative for the same
reason as the corresponding expression is negative in the three-country model. The fact that it
is different from zero means that Sweden faces larger total exchange rate variability when
being inside the union and shocks hit the rest of the EMU-area.
Demand Shock in the US
When Sweden has its own flexible currency, there is no difference between the EMU and the
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S f  W 
EMU  -  f  W 
S f  US
EMU 
A ( f  EMU 
S  +  f  US
S  +  f  W 
S ) 
> 
<  0 .
This expression will in general be different from zero meaning that exchange rate variability
increases if Sweden joins the monetary union. It may be equal to zero, however, in the
interesting special case when
f  US
S 
f  W 
S  = 
f  US
EMU 
f  W 
EMU  .
In that case the relative importance of the US and the rest of the world is the same for Sweden
and the EMU-area. Then Sweden and the EMU are so similar that they in this regard
constitute an optimum currency area and that is why Sweden can join the EMU without any
increase in exchange rate variability. Membership in the EMU generally means more
variability, though, when shocks hit the US.
Results in Brief
The only important difference when a fourth country is added arises when shocks hit the US.
The effect on Sweden of such a shock resembles that of a shock in the rest of the EMU-area
as it in general leads to an increase in both exchange rate and output variability as a result of
membership in the EMU. There is one exception, though: If Sweden and the EMU aresymmetric in their relations to their international environment, then they constitute an
optimum currency area and exchange rate and output variability will not increase with
membership in the EMU.
4.3 Second Period Price Variability
The results of shocks in the US are analogous to those that follow from shocks in the EMU in
section 3.3. Shocks in Sweden and the EMU have the same qualitative effects on Sweden as
in the analysis with three countries.
4.4  Total Real Exchange Rate Variability
The total real effects of shocks in the EMU and the US are qualitatively equivalent to those
shown in Table 2. The effects of shocks in Sweden completely correspond to those in Table 1.
4.5 Using the Absolute Value Index
For many large and multinational companies it seems reasonable that decreasing exports to
Germany may be compensated for by increasing exports to the USA and thus the previous
analysis using the Average Exchange Rate Index can be justified. One can, however, imagine
a situation where a firm has a sales organisation in only one of the countries mentioned above
or that other factors make it costly to redirect exports from one country to another. If such
redirectional costs exist then all changes in exchange rates are costly even if total terms of
trade for Sweden remain unchanged after a shock. If this description is more adequate, then
the Absolute Value Index (dAVI ) below may be a better measure of variability.
Absolute Value Index (dAVI ): dAVI = 
f  EMU 
S  dE
S  / EMU  +  f  W 
S  dE
S / W 
f  EMU 
S  +  f  W 
S  .
The number of countries in the model will now be reduced to three to facilitate an easier way
of interpreting the changes in the Absolute Value Index 19.
                                                
19In a four-country setting the use of the Absolute Value Index gives rise to some complicating technicalities
which make it harder to focus on the fundamental difference between the two indices used in this paper. For
instance, conditions on relative economic distances to different countries in the sense explained on pages 19 and











It is by no means impossible to handle these complications but they give rise to quite a few different cases
necessary to study. Conclusions founded on empirical evidence about which cases are the most relevant to study
are in some cases sensitive to such things as whether the United Kingdom enters the EMU. These issues are not
irrelevant but analysing them here would be too far-reaching.4.6 First Period Absolute Value Exchange Rate Variability
Demand shock in Sweden
The results are identical to those when the Average Exchange Rate Index is used since the
krona appreciates against all other currencies which means that all exchange rate changes
have the same sign and then the choice of index does not matter. Just as before variation in
output replaces variation in the value of the krona if Sweden joins the monetary union.
Demand shock in the EMU
The change in the Absolute Value Index caused by an EMU-shock is
dAVI
du
EMU  = 
1 
f  EMU 
S  +  f  W 
S  f  EMU 
S  dE
S  / EMU 
du
EMU  +  f  W 
S  dE
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As discussed earlier dE
S / EMU 
du
EMU  >0 since the euro appreciates against all exchange rates
including the krona while dE
S / W 
du
EMU  <0 as the krona will follow the euro in its appreciation
against currency W. Then comparing the two exchange rate regimes by taking the difference











f  W 
S (  f  W 
S  -  f  EMU 
S  ) 
f  W 
EMU ( f  EMU 
S  +  f  W 
S ) 
2 
The sign of this expression depends on the importance of different trade partners. If the
importance, seen from the Swedish point of view, of the the rest of the world is greater than
the importance of the EMU, then this expression is positive meaning that Sweden faces larger




S / W 
< 0 
1 2 3  =  dE
S / EMU 
> 0 
1  2  4  3  4  +  dE
EMU  / W 
< 0 
1  2  4  3  4  . (21)
The size of the change in E 
S / W 
 increases if Sweden decides to enter the EMU as variation in
dE
EMU  / W 
 stays unaffected while variation in E 
S / EMU 
 disappears completely. If the rest of the
world is the most important trade partner then variability increases as the effect from (21)
dominates over the direct effect of the elimination of variation in E 
S / EMU 
.
4.7 Second Period Price Variability
When shocks hit Sweden the appreciation of the krona, through the once and for all change in
the nominal exchange rate, completely absorbs the effect of a shock if Sweden stays outsidethe EMU. If Sweden enters the monetary union the same change in international relative
prices takes place one period later through a change in the price of the Swedish good.
That shocks outside Sweden have no effects in the second period if the krona is
flexible is also easy to understand as the period one adjustments in nominal exchange rates
are sufficient to restore long run equilibrium immediately in all countries of the world. Figure
3a illustrates the effects of an EMU-shock, where the P 
EMU  / P 
W -line shows the immediate
and permanent appreciation of the euro. The krona appreciates against currency W and
depreciates against the euro, which the P 
S / P 
EMU - and P 
S / P 
W -lines illustrate. The P 
S / P 
* -
line is an average of Swedish relative prices against the EMU and the rest of the world and
shows changes in total Swedish terms of trade. This just illustrates the earlier result that the
krona adjusts to shocks just enough to keep total terms of trade constant which keeps the
Swedish goods market in long-run equilibrium at all times.
Figure 3: Swedish Relative Prices
a) Flexible Regime
R e  l a t i v  e 
p r i c e s 
t  i m e 
P    / P 
S  * 
P    / P 
S  W 
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S  EMU 
P                / P 
EMU       W 
b) Monetary Union
R e  l a t i v  e 
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A shock in the EMU, when Sweden is a part of the monetary union, also leads to an
immediate and permanent appreciation of the euro (P 
EMU  / P 
W  increases) which can be seen
in Figure 3b. This appreciation affects the Swedish relative price against the rest of the world
(P 
S / P 
W ) in exactly the same way during the first period since Sweden and the EMU have a
common currency. The relative price between Sweden and the EMU stays constant in period
one, of course, which the P 
S / P 
EMU -line illustrates. The model in this paper has a uniquelong-run solution so the relative prices must move to the same levels as in Figure 3a as soon
as prices become flexible in the second period. This explains the new levels of P 
S / P 
W  and
P 
S / P 
EMU  from the second period and onwards. The Absolute Value Index measures the size
of the distance "a" in Figure 3b. The total change in relative prices in period two
(corresponding to the change in the Absolute Value Index in the first period) is given by the
sum of the absolute values of the price changes "b" and "c" in the figure. It can be shown that
the second period price change is equal to the absolute value of
dE





which is the change in the price of the Swedish good that would have taken place through the
nominal exchange rate if this exchange rate would have been flexible. This means that the, in
fact, inevitable appreciation of the krona will take place through an equally large rise in the
price of the Swedish good in period two. The P 
S / P 
* -line illustrates that total terms of trade
depart from its long-run level during the first period causing a temporary change in output. In
the second period both total terms of trade and output return to their original levels.
4.8 Total Real Exchange Rate Variability
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which is a measure of the increase in total real exchange rate variability when second period
effects have been taken into account. This expression states that total real exchange rate
variability increases if Sweden joins the EMU and shocks appear outside Sweden. The
justification of the addition of the relative price changes in the two periods is that firms have
to take the full cost of adjustments to the new situation in the first period after a shock and
then make another costly adjustment when goods prices and wages change one period later.
Tables 3 and 4 below sum the results when the Absolute Value Index is used. Tables 1
and 3 look the same which illustrates the fact that the choice of index does not affect the
results when shocks hit Sweden. Table 4 differs from table 2 as the AVI assigns a positive
value to a change in exchange rates even if those changes leave total terms of trade
unaffected.Table 3: Effects of a Shock in Sweden
C h  a n g e    i  n    n o m i  n a l     e x c h a n g  e    r a t e s    (  p e r  i o  d    1 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    g o o  d s    p r i  c  e s     ( p e r i  o d    2 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    r e a l     e x c h  a n g e    r a t e  s    (  p e  r i o  d    1    a n d    2 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    o u t p u t 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 










Table 4: Effects of a Shock in the EMU
C h  a n g e    i  n    n o m i  n a l     e x c h a n g  e    r a t e s    (  p e r  i o  d    1 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    g o o  d s    p r i  c  e s     ( p e r i  o d    2 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    r e a l     e x c h  a n g e    r a t e  s    (  p e  r i o  d    1    a n d    2 ) 
C h  a n g e    i  n    o u t p u t 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 











The purpose of the simulation in this section is to calculate numerical measures of the effects
of shocks in different countries. Two possible EMU-entrants will be considered: Sweden and
the UK. The US, Norway and the UK are important Swedish trade partners and shocks in
these countries may potentially have asymmetric effects on Sweden and the EMU. From the
British point of view, asymmetric relations to the US seem to be the most important as shocks
in the small countries Sweden and Norway have limited effects on the UK. To examine the
potential asymmetries mentioned above, data from all EU-countries, Norway and the US are
used in the simulation.
Based upon the model derived in Appendix A a variant of the reduced form (A17) is
used to simulate the theoretical model. Start from the goods market equilibrium condition
(A16a), disregard from the intertemporal effects of changes in the Swedish real interest rate
between the first and second periods, change notation by swapping EX EMU 
S   for C  S 
EMU  (and
EX W 
S   for C  S 
W )20, Then substitute (A10) for C  S 
S  and differentiate (A16a) to get21
                                                
20Swedish exports to the EMU are of course equivalent to the EMU citizens' consumption of the Swedish good.dY
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g (  1 + i ) 
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S  / W . (23)
The elasticity of exports with respect to changes in exchange rates is set to be equal to 2 as
there is empirical evidence suggesting that this elasticity is roughly equal to two22. The
impact of exchange rate changes on aggregate demand is less than what the value of the
export elasticity first seems to suggest, however, as exports to some extent consist of
imported goods. To take this into account the elasticity is multiplied by (  1 - g ) . The implicit
assumption behind this is that exports have the same degree of import content as total output
in a particular country23. Equation (23) can thus be expressed in terms of g , the world market
interest rate, GDP, exports and elasticities of exports with respect to the exchange rate. Let el
denote the export elasticity, add a fourth country and restate the counterpart to (14) that will
be used in this section:
(  1  - g )  el
g Y 
S 
(  1  - g EMU )  el
g EMU Y 
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The world market real interest rate is set to 5.5%24. All data refer to the year of 1995 and all
shocks are Government demand shocks that create a direct increase in aggregate demand of a
size equivalent to one percent of GDP.
                                                                                                                                                       
21 To simplify the expressions for the elasticities of exports with respect to exchange rates, all variables possible
to express in euro are expressed in that currency which means that all exchange rates become equal to one in the
initial equilibrium.
22The Goldstein & Kahn (1985) survey shows that there is little reason to allow for differentiated export
elasticities as the ranking of individual countries regarding their export elasticities differs between the different
studies quoted in Goldstein & Kahn.
23Remember that g   is the ratio of (Swedish) imports to GDP.
24About one half of the financial savings of Swedish households are in common stocks or in funds that invest in
common stocks and the other half in interest-bearing assets. As Brealey & Myers (1991) state on page 131, the5.2 Results and Interpretations for Sweden
The results from the numerical simulation are presented in Tables 5a-5c. These tables show
results from the case where the US is the fourth country of the model and both the UK and
Denmark remain outside the EMU. The other cases have very similar interpretations so to
give a more focused presentation, the results of these cases can be found in Table 8 in
Appendix B.
First consider an example that explains how the mechanisms work. Let aggregate
demand increase by 1% in Sweden. When this happens the krona appreciates to keep the






which means that the krona appreciates approximately 2% as a result of the demand shock.
Since the elasticity of exports with respect to exchange rates is assumed to be equal to 2, this
appreciation results in a 4% decrease in exports. The import content in Swedish exports is
about 27% so only 73% of the decrease in exports affect Swedish aggregate demand. Exports
are roughly one third of aggregate demand so aggregate demand is reduced by
0  . 73￿  1 3 ￿ 4  % » 1  .  0  % . Adjustments in the value of the krona thus ensure that the Swedish
goods market remains in long-run equilibrium.
Being a member of the monetary union, this shock will have another impact on the
Swedish economy. The direct increase in aggregate demand is still 1%. The value of the krona
can no longer adjust to compensate for the shock so output must jump to a higher level for
one period until prices can adjust. This temporary increase is 1% which can be seen in Table
5a.
Table 5a: Effects on Sweden of a Shock in Sweden
                                                                                                                                                       
average annual real returns on government bons and corporate bonds between 1926 and 1988 are 1.7% and
2.4%, respectively. The corresponding average annual rate of return on common stocks is 8.8%. The average
(5.5% annually) of a normal risk-free return (2%) and a normal return on common stocks (9%) is therefore used
as an estimate of the appropriate discount factor for the households in their intertemporal maximisation problem.
Changes in the interest rate only have small effects on the numerical results and thus the value of this parameter
is not particularly critical.-  1 .  9 8 5 2 %  -  1 .  9 8 5 2 %  1 .  9 8 5 2 %  1 .  9 8 5 2 % 
n o m i n a l     e x c  h a n g e    r  a t e s 
g o  o d s    p r i c  e s 
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o u t p u t 
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0 %  0 % 
0 %  0 % 
C h  a n g e    i  n 
Table 5b: Effects on Sweden of a Shock in the EMU
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F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 
U n i o  n 
d A E I  d A  V I 
0 %  2 .  6 5 4 9 % 
- 1 .  5 8 1 4 % 
3 .  1 3 9 3 %  3 .  0 4 1 2 % 
-  1 .  5 8 1 4 %  0 %  0 % 
0 %  0 % 
3 .  1 3 9 3 %  -  3 .  1 3 9 3 % 
C h  a n g e    i  n 
Table 5c: Effects on Sweden of a Shock in the US
0 %  -  0 .  1 4 4 2 % *  0 .  9 1 9 4 %  1 .  0 5 9 6 % 
n o m i n a l     e x c  h a n g e    r  a t e s 
g o  o d s    p r i c  e s 
r e a l     e x c h  a n g e    r a t e  s 
o u t p u t 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 
U n i o  n 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 
U n i o  n 
d A E I  d A  V I 
0 %  0 .  9 1 9 4 % 
- 0 .  0 7 2 6 % 
0 .  1 4 4 2 %  0 .  1 3 9 7 % 
-  0 .  0 7 2 6 %  0 %  0 % 
0 %  0 % 
0 .  9 1 9 9 %  -  0 .  1 4 4 2 % 
C h  a n g e    i  n 
 
Variability Measured by the Average Exchange Rate Index
                                                
 * The total terms of trade return to their original value after one period which motivates 0% as an alternative
entry. The entry given in the table can be motivated by the fact that a change in nominal exchange rates in the
first period also is a temporary change in real exchange rates as prices are constant.The shock considered above gives rise to a 1.9852% appreciation of the nominal exchange
rate when all exchange rates are flexible. Being inside the union an equally large change in
the value of the krona takes place one period later through a change in the price of the
Swedish good but the output level will in this case be away from long-run equilibrium until
goods prices adjust.
If a shock hits the EMU-area instead, then the euro appreciates against all currencies
including the krona. To keep the Swedish goods market in equilibrium, the krona appreciates






which is a theoretical result already discussed. If Sweden becomes a member of the EMU
does not affect the appreciation of the euro but the appreciation of the euro will contract
Swedish aggregate demand and to clear the goods market Swedish output now has to decrease
by 1.5814%. Sweden will also experience an increase in real exchange rate variability due to a
temporary appreciation of terms of trade (-3.1393%). This happens because the krona cannot
depreciate to compensate for the appreciation of the euro.
A shock in the US works in much the same way as the shock in the EMU above. One
difference, though, is that the magnitude of the effects is much smaller. To compensate for the
appreciation of the dollar against the euro, the euro has to appreciate against currency W to
leave aggregate demand unaffected in the EMU-area. Since Sweden and the EMU have
similar relations to the US, these exchange rate changes that keeps aggregate demand
unchanged in the EMU, leave Sweden almost unaffected too. There will only remain a small
need for the krona to depreciate against the euro25 (by 0.1397%) or, alternatively, a need for a
small decline in output (by 0.0726%).
As the change in real exchange rates reveals, shocks in the EMU affect Swedish
competitiveness much more (-0.1637%) than shocks in the US
(-0.0075%) which suggests that the existence of asymmetries between Sweden and the EMU
are much more important than asymmetries in trade relations with the US26.
                                                
25See Table 6a in Appendix B for details.
26This result still holds when the UK or Norway is used as the fourth country of the model. The reason for this
result is that the EMU is by far the most important trade partner to Sweden.Variability Measured by the Absolute Value Index
When using the Absolute Value Index, Swedish shocks give exactly the same results as above
so the interesting cases are those when shocks hit the EMU or the US. The Average Exchange
Rate Index states clearly that variability increases if Sweden joins the EMU and shocks hit the
EMU or the US. For the Absolute Value Index, on the other hand, a theoretical analysis gives
ambiguous results regarding variability in the first period and therefore it is interesting to
examine the numerical results. Tables 5b and 5c show that Sweden will have to face more
variability in the first period if it enters the monetary union but the differences are quite small
compared to the differences in variability presented above when using the other index. The
reason for the large differences when the Average Exchange Rate Index is used is that all
exchange rate changes cancel when the krona is flexible, while the appreciation of the euro, if
Sweden is a part of the EMU, affects the index to a large extent. The changes in Swedish
exchange rates, when the krona is flexible, are added in the Absolute Value Index, instead of
cancelling out, assigning positive values to the change in the value of the index under both
exchange rate regimes. When Norway is the fourth country and the UK and Denmark have
joined "Euroland", then variability decreases if Sweden enters the EMU so there is no definite
answer to the question about what exchange rate regime is preferable when focus is on
nominal exchange rate variability. What can be seen is that, no matter which countries are
studied, shocks in the EMU result in more exchange rate variability than shocks in the US, the
UK or Norway. One can also see that, when changes in goods prices in the second period are
taken into account, real exchange rate variability increases when Sweden becomes a part of
the EMU and shocks hit the EMU or the US, but that is, of course, a theoretical result already
discussed.
Sensitivity Analysis
The length of the period with fixed prices has been assumed to be one year in this section.
Time enters the model via the interest rate so by cutting the interest rate to one half of its
original value one can study both the effects of a lower interest rate or of a six months period
with fixed prices. All results are only affected to a very small extent by different interest rates
in the range from 2% to 9% annually.
Changes in the elasticity of exports with respect to exchange rates affect all changes in
exchange rates proportionally so by increasing the export elasticity from 2 to 4 all values of
the indices become half as large.
One can also let an equally large shock hit Sweden and the EMU simultaneously. This
reduces the need for adjustments in the exchange rate between the krona and the euro as well
as in output but the variability does not disappear since Sweden and the EMU have different
trading patterns and degrees of openness.Weighting shocks in different countries
It seems reasonable that the probability of the event that a shock of the size of one percent of
GDP hits EMU is smaller than the probability that a correspondingly large shock hits Sweden.
The reason is that the EMU consists of many countries whose GDP changes are not perfectly
correlated. Therefore shocks in different EMU-countries are likely to cancel to some extent.
In order to examine this, standard deviations of the relative changes in GDP for the EMU-
countries, Sweden and the US are calculated. The data used are real annual GDP from 1975 to
1995. This standard deviation does not measure the standard deviation of the demand shocks
discussed in this paper but, given the assumption that demand shocks have the same
importance in explaining GDP variability in all these countries, it should give some indication
of the relative sizes of normal shocks27.
Let Sweden be hit by a normal-sized 2.3 percent shock and let the other countries be
hit by shocks, adjusted in size according to the differences in standard deviations of the
relative GDP-changes. Then one can compare the effects of normal-sized shocks in the
different countries. The results of this can be seen in Table 6. The unambiguous result is that
there is no sign of a reduction in neither total real exchange rate variability nor output
variability as a result of a Swedish membership in the monetary union, no matter what index
is used.
Table 6: Effects on the Real Exchange Rate and on Output
F 
A E I 
U  F  U  F  U 
A  V I  Y 
4 .  6 %  4 .  6 %  4 .  6 %  4 .  6 %  0 %  2 .  3 % 
0 %  - 5 .  3 %  4 .  5 %  1 0 .  5 %  0 %  -  2 .  7 % 
0 %  - 0 .  3 6 %  2 .  3 %  2 .  6 %  0 %  -  0 .  2 % 
S  h o c  k    i  n 
S  w e d e n 
t h e    E M U 
t h e    U S 
Results in Brief
First consider the Average Exchange Rate Index. With a flexible exchange rate regime the
krona has to appreciate approximately twice as much as the percentage change in aggregate
demand caused by a Swedish demand shock. A 1% increase in aggregate demand in the EMU
gives rise to a 3.1% appreciation of the Average Exchange Rate Index if Sweden is a member
of the monetary union compared to a 0.14% appreciation if a corresponding shock occurs in
                                                
27The standard deviations are: the EMU: 1,7%, Sweden: 2,3% and the US: 2,5%. The large standard deviation
in the US can to a large extent be explained by one outlier: the large decrease in GDP between 1981 and 1982.the US. The much larger impact of EMU-shocks is a general result and holds regardless of
which country is used as the fourth country.
Then consider the results when the Absolute Value Index is used. Variability increases
as a consequence of a Swedish membership if variation in goods prices in the second period is
taken into account. When focus is on nominal exchange rate variability, instead, and shocks
hit the fourth country or the EMU the picture is rather dispersed. Variability can both increase
and decrease if Sweden enters the monetary union depending on which country is chosen and
also depending on what decision Denmark and the UK take regarding their membership in the
EMU.
5.3 Results and Interpretations for the United Kingdom
The simulation can naturally be done from a British point of view as well. The results are only
reported for the most interesting case where the US is the fourth country.28. The most
important conclusion is that the United Kingdom will get similar-sized effects of an entry to
the EMU which can be seen in Tables 7a-7c. To clear the British goods market after a British
shock the pound has to appreciate by approximately 3%. This appreciation is larger than the
corresponding Swedish appreciation reflecting the fact that the United Kingdom is a slightly
more closed economy. If the UK enters the EMU and a shock hits the EMU, then British
Table 7a: Effects on the UK of a Shock in the UK
-  2 .  8 9 1 9 %  -  2 .  8 9 1 9 %  2 .  8 9 1 9 %  2 .  8 9 1 9 % 
n o m i n a l     e x c  h a n g e    r  a t e s 
g o  o d s    p r i c  e s 
r e a l     e x c h  a n g e    r a t e  s 
o u t p u t 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 
U n i o  n 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 
U n i o  n 
d A E I  d A  V I 
-  2 .  8 9 1 9 %  2 .  8 9 1 9 % 
1 .  0 0 0 0 % 
-  2 .  8 9 1 9 %  2 .  8 9 1 9 % 
1 .  0 0 0 0 %  0 %  0 % 
0 %  0 % 
0 %  0 % 
C h  a n g e    i  n 
Table 7b: Effects on the UK of a Shock in the EMU
                                                
28Sweden and Norway affect the British economy to a much smaller extent than the US as trade with Sweden or
Norway is less than one fourth of the trade with the US.0 %  -  2 .  0 3 0 6 % *  2 .  1 9 7 6 %  3 .  8 8 5 3 % 
n o m i n a l     e x c  h a n g e    r  a t e s 
g o  o d s    p r i c  e s 
r e a l     e x c h  a n g e    r a t e  s 
o u t p u t 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 
U n i o  n 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 
U n i o  n 
d A E I  d A  V I 
0 %  2 .  1 9 7 6 % 
- 0 .  7 0 2 2 % 
2 .  0 3 0 6 %  1 .  8 5 4 7 % 
-  0 .  7 0 2 2 %  0 %  0 % 
0 %  0 % 
2 .  0 3 0 6 %  -  2 .  0 3 0 6 % 
C h  a n g e    i  n 
Table 7c: Effects on the UK of a Shock in the US
0 %  -  0 .  2 5 9 4 % *  1 .  1 0 0 4 %  1 .  1 3 8 7 % 
n o m i n a l     e x c  h a n g e    r  a t e s 
g o  o d s    p r i c  e s 
r e a l     e x c h  a n g e    r a t e  s 
o u t p u t 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 
U n i o  n 
F l  e x i b  l e 
R e g  i m e 
M o n e t a r  y 
U n i o  n 
d A E I  d A  V I 
0 %  1 .  1 0 0 4 % 
- 0 .  0 8 9 7 % 
0 .  2 5 9 4 %  0 .  2 3 6 9 % 
-  0 .  0 8 9 7 %  0 %  0 % 
0 %  0 % 
0 .  9 0 1 8 %  -  0 .  2 5 9 4 % 
C h  a n g e    i  n 
competitiveness deteriorates, of course, but the deterioration is smaller (2.0306%) than the
corresponding Swedish deterioration when Sweden is studied (3.1393%). The main reason for
this is that the share of UK exports going to the EU (60%) is larger than the corresponding
share for Sweden (44%)29. This means that the exchange rate between the pound and the euro
has more weight in the exchange rate index for the UK. The great importance of the
elimination of variation in this exchange rate, as a result of an entry into the EMU, reduces
the total increase in the Average Exchange Rate Index. Shocks in the US affect the UK more
than Sweden as the US is more important to the UK than to Sweden30 but such shocks still
affect the UK much less than shocks emanating from the EMU.
                                                
29This figure is valid when Denmark and the UK stay outside the EMU.
30Exports from the UK to the US constitute 11% of total British exports while the corresponding figure for
Sweden is 7%.6. Conclusions
The most important result is that a Swedish and British membership in the EMU in many
cases leads to more exchange rate variability and also to more output variability. The perhaps
most crucial assumption to generate these results is that prices are more sticky than nominal
exchange rates. There is no doubt that goods prices and wages are more sticky than nominal
exchange rates but, the question of how important such stickiness is, has no clear answer.
Two measures on total exchange rate variability have been used: the Average
Exchange Rate Index (AEI) and the Absolute Value Index (AVI). The difference between the
indices is how the sign of an exchange rate change is handled. All changes are added when
the Absolute Value Index is used while exchange rates moving in opposite directions may
cancel out when the Average Exchange Rate Index is used.
Start with the simplest shock to analyse: the domestic shock. When shocks hit the
entrant, nominal exchange rate variability can be eliminated by joining the EMU. If the
nominal exchange rate is not allowed to change, then the output level of the entering country
temporarily moves away from its long run equilibrium level. An equally large change in
goods prices in the second period will, however, replace the change in nominal exchange rates
that can be eliminated by a membership so the conclusion for domestic shocks is that a
decision to enter the monetary union will only postpone an inevitable change in the real
exchange rate but it will lead to more output variability.
Shocks in countries outside the entrant unambiguously give the result that real
exchange rate variability increases as a result of an entry into the monetary union. The reason
is that the Swedish or British currency (the euro in this case) appreciates to keep the EMU-
economy in long-run equilibrium. If the entrant stayed outside the EMU, then the value of its
currency could adjust to leave total terms of trade unaffected, meaning less variability of both
exchange rates and output31.
When evaluating which index is the most appropriate to use, the crucial point is, as
mentioned earlier, whether firms can redirect their exports to other countries easily or not.
Large multinational companies can probably redirect their exports more easily as they have
already existing international networks of sales organisations and as they have easier access to
the human capital needed to enter new foreign markets. The major part of international trade
goes via large companies which suggests that the Average Exchange Rate Index is more
appropriate. Small firms may be much more exposed to one or a few countries, however,
which gives support to the use of the Absolute Value Index. Moreover, redirecting exports is
probably costly not only for small firms but also for large firms which gives additional
                                                
31Variability of the nominal exchange rate can both increase and decrease when variability is measured by the
AVI depending on where shocks occur (in the EMU, the US, the UK or Norway) and also on the decisions of the
UK and Denmark regarding their possible future membership in the EMU but this ambiguity disappears if the
price changes in the second period are taken into account. In that case a membership in the EMU definitely leads
to an increase in exchange rate variability.support to the Absolute Value Index. The economy as a whole is likely to be characterised
partly by flexible export streams and partly by redirectional costs.
If one lets an equally big shock hit the EMU and the entrant simultaneously one gets a
symmetric shock. Such shocks will reduce the magnitude of the results in this paper but the
results will not disappear as long as the entrant and the EMU have different trading patterns.
The relevance of the results in this paper thus partly depends on the degree of asymmetry
between the entering country and the EMU. Empirical measures of the degree of asymmetry
are sensitive to the model and time period chosen32 when studying this issue but it can be
stated that "country-specific asymmetric shocks largely explain the short-term
macroeconomic development in Sweden"33. Another important issue is whether real or
financial shocks dominate. The results of an analysis by Alun Thomas (1997) suggest that real
shocks play an important role in real exchange rate movements in Sweden and thus giving
support to the approach with real shocks used in this paper. Financial disturbances exist,
however, and it would therefore in some cases be optimal to have a fixed exchange rate to
insulate the real economy from such shocks but several studies indicate that financial
disturbances only explain a small part of variation in output but a large part of variation in
inflation34. The possibly large temporary deviations from the long term value of the exchange
rate caused by lack of credibility for fiscal policy will probably be smaller for an EMU-
country than for a small outsider as a crisis in Sweden, for instance, will affect the value of
the krona much more than the value of the euro.
All the results above are derived under the assumption that prices are sticky and
shocks permanent. Regardless of which of the two possible exchange rate regimes that is
chosen there will be a need for permanent adjustments in international relative prices to
restore equilibrium if shocks are permanent. Therefore a membership in the monetary union
will have no effect on changes in terms of trade in the long-run. The real exchange rate will
change in any case but, by staying outside the monetary union, Sweden or the United
Kingdom can obtain shorter periods away from long-run equilibrium.
7. Appendices
7.1 Appendix A: Derivation of a Reduced Form for the Goods Market
The reduced form for aggregate demand used in the main text will be derived from
microeconomic behaviour in this appendix. Just as in the main text, the world consists of
three countries: Sweden (S), the EMU and the rest of the world (W). There are three different
goods available to consumers; one produced in each country.




By assumption, the government only demands domestic goods and services. Shocks in
government expenditures are nominal and permanent and contribute additively to individual
utility. Since Ricardian equivalence holds in this model, nothing is lost by simply assuming
that the government budget is always balanced:
G t = T  t , "  t .
A permanent positive shock in government expenditures that hits the EMU thus has two
effects on the Swedish economy:
1) The increase in aggregate demand in the EMU is an asymmetric stimuli of demand for the
EMU-good relative to the Swedish good.
2) A rise in government expenditures in the EMU-area means that the resulting increase in
taxes takes disposable income away from consumers living in the EMU. Faced with less
income the EMU-citizens cut consumption both of domestic and foreign goods. This results
in a direct decrease of demand for the Swedish good through a decrease in Swedish exports.
To facilitate the derivation of a simple reduced form for the goods market35, suppose the
second effect above does not exist. This means that the shocks henceforth will be somewhat
less asymmetric. The effects caused by asymmetries in the simplified model will thus appear
smaller which should be remembered when the results are interpreted.
The Firms
Suppose that production is characterised by constant returns to scale and that nominal wages
and goods prices remain constant until one period of time has elapsed after the appearance of
a shock. Production is then completely demand-determined during the period with constant
prices. After this period, nominal wages and goods prices adjust to immediately bring output
back to its long run equilibrium level. Goods prices are set in domestic currency.
The Consumers
Preferences are assumed to be properly described by a standard CES utility function. In line
with empirical results36 and as a convenient simplification assume that the elasticity of
imports with respect to the real exchange rate is equal to one. One way of entering this
                                                
35Demand for the Swedish good in expression (A17) will then depend positively on total output abroad instead
of disposable income.
36Goldstein & Kahn (1985).assumption into the model is by altering the utility function to the one in the maximisation
problem (A4) below. This particular utility function has Cobb-Douglas-utility between
domestic goods and imports and CES-utility between imports from different countries.
Through this specification expenditures on imports become a constant share of total
expenditures which is equivalent to the elasticity of imports with respect to the real exchange
rate being equal to one.
Consumers are assumed to hold no assets initially to avoid the possibly important
effects of exchange rate changes on permanent income via changes in the size of foreign net
assets37. large negative net foreign assets may result in Privately held assets are assumed to be
zero initially. It is straightforward to allow for assets but they
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where C  Wt
S  , for instance, denotes the Swedish individuals' period t consumption of the good
produced in the rest of the world. The price of this good, P  t 
W , must be multiplied by the
nominal exchange rate,E  t 
S / W , to be measured in kronor. The subjective discount factor ß 
belongs to the interval (0,1) in line with standard assumptions. Real income before taxes, Y  1 
S ,
can vary in period one but the economy will immediately reach its steady state income level in
period two when prices become fully flexible. Disposable income is equal to Y  t 
S  minus the
lump-sum tax T  t 
S .
Solving the optimisation problem gives standard Euler conditions:
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It can be seen from (A2) that steady state from period two and onwards demands that
                                                
37It is, in principle, straightforward to allow for non-zero assets but the effects of changes in the value of such
assets are not a main issue of this paper.b = 
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since inflation in steady state is assumed to be zero and nominal exchange rates only change
instantly due to a shock. Use the conditions for this steady state and the utility function
mentioned above to rewrite38 (A1):
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where overbars indicate steady state values of the variables, and disposable income YD
S 
 is
equal to Y 
S -  T 
S 
. To simplify notation further all nominal prices, except the price of the
Swedish good in steady state, are normalised to one. The reformulated problem (A4) has the
following first order conditions:
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 to show that the assumption of steady state from the
second period onwards means that the problem can be handled as a two period problem with one sticky prices
period and one steady state period.Together with the budget constraint in (A4) the first order conditions (A5) to (A9) form an
equation system in the six unknown variables C  S 
S , C  EMU 
S  , C  W 
S  , C  S 
S 
, C  EMU 
S 
 and C  W 
S 
. Solve for the
different components of Swedish period one consumption:
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The Consumption Decision in the EMU and the Rest of the World
The optimisation problem of the individuals in the EMU has a completely analogous
structure:
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This analogy means that one can immediately state that
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Define the optimisation in an analogous way in the rest of the world and solve for the world's
import of Swedish goods:1 
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Goods Market Equilibrium in Sweden
Equilibrium in the Swedish goods market demands that
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which can be rewritten as
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if the elasticity of exports with respect to the real exchange rate is close to one. The equations







which can be substituted into (A16) to give
Y 
S = F 
S ( E 
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S  / W , G 
S , Y 
S 
, Y 
EMU , Y 
EMU 
, Y 
W , Y 
W 
, i  , G  ) , (A17)
where G   is the parameter vector ( g  , g  EMU , g  W , d  , d  EMU , d  W ) . The important property used in the
main text, that aggregate demand depends positively on the exchange rates, holds in (A17)
too, which can be shown easily. In this way government expenditures shocks can be analysed
but one can see from (A17) that the results in the main text can be interpreted as emanating
from other shocks such as shocks in foreign income or Swedish permanent income, in the
world market interest rate or in preferences. Differentiating gives
dY
S = f EMU 
S  dE
S / EMU  + f W 
S dE
S / W  + du
S , (A18)
where du
S = f  G 
S dG
S . Expression (A18) is equivalent to the central equation (4) in the main
text.7.2 Appendix B: Numerical Results for Sweden
This appendix provides tables showing the effects on output and on all exchange rates due to
shocks in different countries. The tables also show changes in the value of the exchange rate
indices. The columns dAEIu-dAEIf and dAVIu-dAVIf measure the difference of the absolute
values of the corresponding indices. A negative value in such a column thus indicates that
variability would decrease if Sweden would enter the EMU.
Table 8a: Numerical results
4th country: the US (DK and the UK outside the EMU)
Flexible Regime
Shock in dEse dEeu dEew dEsu dEsw
Sweden -1.9231% -0.0813% -0.1145% -2.0044% -2.0376%
EMU 3.0412% -4.5841% -5.5215% -1.5428% -2.4803%
US 0.1397% 5.1839% -1.0806% 5.3236% -0.9409%
Monetary Union
Shock in dYs dEeu dEew
Sweden 1.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000%
EMU -1.5814% -4.7126% -5.7025%
US -0.0726% 5.1780% -1.0889%
Indices (first period)
Shock in dAEIf dAEIu dAEIu-dAEIf dAVIf dAVIu dAVIu-
dAVIf
Sweden -1.9852% 0.0000% -1.9852% 1.9852% 0.0000% -1.9852%
EMU 0.0000% -3.1393% 3.1393% 2.6549% 3.1393% 0.4844%
US 0.0000% -0.1442% 0.1442% 0.9194% 0.9199% 0.0004%Table 8b: Numerical results
4th country: Norway (DK and the UK outside the EMU)
Flexible Regime
Shock in dEse dEen dEew dEsn dEsw
Sweden -1.9389% 0.1433% -0.1147% -1.7956% -2.0536%
EMU 2.8572% -2.6221% -5.4246% 0.2351% -2.5674%
Norway -0.1283% 2.1539% -0.0510% 2.0256% -0.1793%
Monetary Union
Shock in dYs dEen dEew
Sweden 1.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000%
EMU -1.4736% -2.4109% -5.5937%
Norway 0.0662% 2.1444% -0.0434%
Indices (first period)
Shock in dAEIf dAEIu dAEIu-dAEIf dAVIf dAVIu dAVIu-
dAVIf
Sweden -1.9852% 0.0000% -1.9852% 1.9852% 0.0000% -1.9852%
EMU 0.0000% -2.9254% 2.9254% 2.5278% 2.9254% 0.3976%
Norway 0.0000% 0.1314% 0.1314% 0.2886% 0.1741% -0.1144%
Table 8c: Numerical results
4th country: the UK (DK and the UK outside the EMU)
Flexible Regime
Shock in dEse dEeu dEew dEsu dEsw
Sweden -1.9161% -0.0106% -0.1423% -1.9268% -2.0584%
EMU 3.2197% -2.8395% -6.2230% 0.3801% -3.0033%
UK 0.1970% 2.4900% -0.8528% 2.6870% -0.6559%
Monetary Union
Shock in dYs dEeu dEew
Sweden 1.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000%
EMU -1.6803% -2.8574% -6.4622%
UK -0.1028% 2.4889% -0.8675%
Indices (first period)
Shock in dAEIf dAEIu dAEIu-dAEIf dAVIf dAVIu dAVIu-
dAVIf
Sweden -1.9852% 0.0000% -1.9852% 1.9852% 0.0000% -1.9852%
EMU 0.0000% -3.3357% 3.3357% 2.8752% 3.3357% 0.4605%
UK 0.0000% -0.2041% 0.2041% 0.6279% 0.6264% -0.0015%Table 8d: Numerical results
4th country: the US (DK and the UK inside the EMU)
Flexible Regime
Shock in dEse dEeu dEew dEsu dEsw
Sweden -1.9213% -0.1140% -0.1664% -2.0353% -2.0877%
EMU 2.7263% -5.3703% -6.9930% -2.6440% -4.2667%
US 0.1231% 4.9415% -1.4839% 5.0645% -1.3608%
Monetary Union
Shock in dYs dEeu dEew
Sweden 1.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000%
EMU -1.4190% -5.5320% -7.2290%
US -0.0640% 4.9342% -1.4946%
Indices (first period)
Shock in dAEIf dAEIu dAEIu-dAEIf dAVIf dAVIu dAVIu-
dAVIf
Sweden -1.9852% 0.0000% 4.1131% 1.9852% 0.0000% 0.0000%
EMU 0.0000% -2.8169% 4.8701% 3.2321% 2.8169% 0.0000%
US 0.0000% -0.1271% 0.0000% 0.9045% 0.8663% 0.0000%
Table 8e: Numerical results
4th country: Norway (DK and the UK inside the EMU)
Flexible Regime
Shock in dEse dEen dEew dEsn dEsw
Sweden -1.9408% 0.1588% -0.1657% -1.7820% -2.1065%
EMU 2.4015% -1.6400% -6.7995% 0.7615% -4.3979%
Norway -0.1274% 2.1596% -0.0786% 2.0322% -0.2060%
Monetary Union
Shock in dYs dEen dEew
Sweden 1.0000% 0.0000% 0.0000%
EMU -1.2374% -1.4435% -7.0045%
Norway 0.0656% 2.1492% -0.0678%
Indices (first period)
Shock in dAEIf dAEIu dAEIu-dAEIf dAVIf dAVIu dAVIu-
dAVIf
Sweden -1.9852% 0.0000% -1.9852% 1.9852% 0.0000% -1.9852%
EMU 0.0000% -2.4564% 2.4564% 2.9555% 2.4564% -0.4991%
Norway 0.0000% 0.1303% 0.1303% 0.2895% 0.1759% -0.1137%References
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